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Home : Quarterly Archives : Volume 23 |
Tredyffrin Easttown Historical Society |
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Source: April 1985 Volume 23 Number 2, Pages 63–79 The Philadelphia and Columbia Rail Road When the Act of the Pennsylvania Legislature "to provide for the commencement of a rail road, to be constructed at the expense of the state, and to be styled the Pennsylvania rail road" was approved by Governor J. Andrew Shulze on March 24, 1828, it marked the third attempt to build a rail road between Philadelphia and the Susquehanna River that would also pass through Tredyffrin and Easttown townships. The first attempt had been made five years earlier, in 1823. On March 31st of that year, in response to a "memorial to the Legislature" by John Stevens, an Act "To incorporate a company to erect a rail road from Philadelphia to Columbia" was approved. In the memorial Colonel Stevens had represented "that a rail road from Philadelphia to Columbia would greatly facilitate the transport between these two places" and that he had made "important improvements in the construction of rail ways". The entity created by the Act was called "The President, Directors and Company of the Pennsylvania Rail Road Company". Under the terms of the Act, it had "the power to survey, lay down, as certain, mark and fix such route as they shall deem expedient for such a road", and "to make, erect and establish a rail road on the route laid out as afore said, to be constructed on the plan and under the supervision of said John Stevens". It was also specified that "on the completion of the said rail road, all transportation on the same, of whatever volume or kind, shall be carried on and conducted by and under the superintendence and direction of said John Stevens, or of his legal representative or representatives". Colonel Stevens, or his legal representative, was also authorized "to charge and receive for freight, on and for the transportation of goods, wares and merchandise, at a rate not exceeding seven cents per mile on each and every ton weight thereof passing westward, and three and a half cents per mile on each and every ton weight passing eastward, on the said rail road". (The Act contained eighteen . sections altogether, setting forth the various duties and powers of the Company.) In July Colonel Stevens spent a week in a horse-and-buggy survey of the terrain between the two cities, but no real survey work was done, nor any fixed route established. While this preliminary reconnaissance reinforced Colonel Stevens' conviction of the practicability of a rail road between the two cities, he could not convince others. Despite numerous letters and advertisements - and in 1825 the actual construction of a locomotive of his own design which he successfully demonstrated on his estate in Hoboken, N.J. - he was unable to raise even $5000 to build a mile of experimental track. Far greater confidence was still being put in a series of canals for the obviously much needed improved "internal communication" within the state. Thus, two years later, in April 1825, in an Act "to appoint a board of Canal Commissioners", the Governor was "hereby required to appoint five canal commissioners ... to consider and adopt such measures as they shall think required and proper, preparatory to the establishment of a navigable communication between the eastern and western sections of the State, and Lake Erie". More specifically, among "the routes to be examined by virtue of this act, shall be one from Philadelphia through Chester and Lancaster counties, and thence by the West Branch of the Susquehanna, and the waters thereof, to the Allegheny, and Pittsburg". Following this "examination", which was to include exploration "for the purpose of fixing and determining the most eligible and proper routes for the same", the Commissioners were also to determine the amounts of water required and available for the canal, to "make, or cause to be made, with as much accuracy and minuteness as may be practicable, calculations and estimates of the sum or sums of money which may or will be necessary for completing such canals", and to "prepare a plain and comprehensive report of all their proceedings ... together with the field notes, drafts, maps, and estimates" - all "within thirty days after the commencement of the next regular session" of the Legislature! The enthusiasm for canals and the confidence in them waned materially, however, after a study by William Strickland. In early 1825 the noted engraver, architect and engineer had been sent to England, on behalf of the Pennsylvania Society for the Promotion of Internal Improvement, "to obtain accurate information on the latest improvements in the various modes of inter-communication in that country". On his return, it was his considered opinion that "Although much wealth and commercial greatness have been produced by numerous canals, still Rail Roads offer greater facilities for the conveyance of goods, with more safety, speed and economy". These findings were discussed in greater detail in a monograph of "Facts and Arguments in Favour of Adopting Railways in Preference to Canals in the State of Pennsylvania", published in early 1825. The 70-page pamphlet, in its fourth edition by August, was divided into four chapters, covering the history of the "art" of transportation; a history of railroads; a comparison of the relative advantages of canals, railways and turnpike roads; and the advantages of railways, compared with canals, in Pennsylvania. Among the several arguments advanced in favor of railways over canals were the "expenses of constructing and repairing railways compared with canals", with the costs for rail roads estimated at about one-third those of canals; that the time required to construct railways was "much less" than the time required for canal construction; that railways "require few superintendents"; that railways "can accommodate an unlimited amount of commerce"; that they "can be made in every situation"; that they "can cross the tallest mountain" and "slight hills offer no obstacle whatever to their progress"; and that they "can be used in all seasons" and are not subject to the "great delays on canals when repairs are required".(It was also noted, incidentally, that horse-power was considered preferable to steam engines as motive power on railways in Pennsylvania.) The report was immediately endorsed by many who read it. "The public know with what zeal," it was observed in the West Chester Village Record on August 3d, "we have, for years, advocated the making a canal from the Delaware to the Susquehanna, through the Great Valley. ... But new light has come in upon our minds ... and to use the words of one of the most estimable citizens who read the pamphlet - 'If the statements therein made may be depended on, the superiority of Rail Ways over canals is demonstrated.'" (Despite this conclusion, it was also noted that the Canal Commissioners nonetheless had "labored zealously in a great and good cause - were useful pioneers - obtained much valuable information - aroused public interest, and ought not to be proscribed" or the "objects of censure and ridicule".) Similarly, in November at a public meeting held in Columbia, after comments by James Buchanan on the advantages of the railway over a canal, it was resolved that "whenever our fellow citizens of Philadelphia shall deem it expedient to embark in the construction of such a rail-way, we will cordially unite with them and use every effort in our power, to accomplish a purpose so desirable". In response, the Legislature passed an Act repealing its earlier Act of 1823 and the charter given John Stevens and authorized the incorporation of "The Columbia, Lancaster and Philadelphia Rail Road Company". It was approved by Governor Shulze on April 7, 1826. Under the Act, fifteen commissioners, three of them from Chester County, were appointed and authorized to open books "at some convenient place in the borough of Columbia, the borough of York, the City of Lancaster, the borough of West Chester, the borough of Norristown, and the City of Philadelphia" to receive subscriptions for the stock of the company. A total of 13,000 shares was authorized, at $50 each, for a total capitalization of $650,000, although it was also provided that "if an increase of the capital stock is deemed necessary by the stockholders to complete the said rail road, it may be lawful ... to increase the number of shares so that the capital of said company shall not exceed one million dollars". Letters patent to organize the corporation were to be issued when subscriptions had been received for 8000 shares. Upon organization of the company, the "president, directors and company" were empowered "to survey, lay down, as certain, make, and fix" the route for a railway between Columbia and Philadelphia, "having due regard to the situation or nature of the ground, and of the buildings thereon,...so as to do the least damage to private property, and the said road shall not be more than four rods wide, and shall not pass through any burying ground nor place of public worship, nor any dwelling house without the consent of the owner thereof, nor shall it pass through any outbuilding of the value of more than three hundred dollars, without such consent". The route was then to be surveyed and mapped, after which it "shall or may be lawful for the company ... to make, erect, and establish a railroad on the route laid out aforesaid". In its twenty-four sections, the Act also designated the permissible grades and other details of the construction of the rail road, the manner of determining damages and compensation to landowners for lands damaged by construction of the road, and the authorized toll schedules, as well as a number of provisions concerning the procedures for the organization of the company. On the first day of July 1826, after the required advertisement, the books were duly opened in the six boroughs or cities to receive subscriptions for the stock. The reception by the public was disappointing. By the end of the year the commissioners still had not obtained subscriptions for the 8000 shares required to issue the letters patent and to organize the company. The second attempt to build a rail road by a private corporation was no more successful than the first had been. Recognizing the importance of the project to the state's program of internal improvements, in an Act "to provide for further extension of the Pennsylvania canal", approved on April 9, 1827, the Legislature required, among other "extensions", that "it shall be the duty of the board of canal commissioners to cause examination, survey and estimate of the routes for a canal, and also for a rail way, with locomotive or stationary engines, from Philadelphia, through Chester and Lancaster counties, so as to connect by the nearest and most eligible route, with the eastern section of the Pennsylvania canal". The survey was made for the Canal Commissioners by Major John Wilson, of the United States Topographical Engineers. Late in the year he reported that the ground and water supply between Philadelphia and the Susquehanna River were not suitable for a canal, but that the area was appropriate for a railway. In the following March the Legislature passed the Act referred to in the first paragraph. It provided, among other internal improvements, that "the canal commissioners are authorized and required to locate on the most eligible route, a rail road from the city of Philadelphia, through the city of Lancaster to Columbia, on the Susquehanna, and from thence to the west end of the borough of York, in the county of York; such part of which east of the Susquehanna, shall be put under contract within the present year, ... with a view to its completion within two years, or as soon thereafter as practicable". Among the Act's eighteen sections was also authorization for the Governor "to borrow on the credit of the commonwealth, a sum or sums in the whole not exceeding two million dollars" to be vested in the Canal Commissioners for the completion of "the canals, rail roads and public works authorized to be constructed by the act". The rail road was a part of a series of railways and canals connecting Philadelphia and Pittsburgh It was known as "the "Main Line of Public Works". Starting in Philadelphia, section boats, laden with merchandise for Pittsburg, could leave Philadelphia on "burden" cars, going by the railway to the Susquehanna. There the sections would be united to form a boat, which would be towed through canals to the eastern base of the Allegheny mountains. At that point the sections would again be separated, to be taken over the mountains by a series of inclined planes of the Allegheny Portage Railway. On the other side, they would again be made into boats to proceed by canal the remaining distance to Pittsburg. Major Wilson, with a corps of assistant engineers and rodmen under his "immediate direction and supervision", immediately began the final "scientific" survey of the route for the rail road. Starting in Columbia, by May they were approaching the city of Lancaster, and by the following month were in Chester County. By mid-September, it was reported in the American Republican, then published in Downingtown, "Major Wilson's company arrived at this place on Saturday evening last. They have determined its [the railroad's] location as far as the Brandywine, at Coatesville; and intend spending some time in examining each side of the Valley for some distance. This is all right, to give general satisfaction; yet there is little doubt but the northern route will be adopted. We are happy to learn," it was further noted, "that the Major and his company have been received by the landholders of our county, with politeness and good humor." The route finally selected by Major Wilson was, in fact, not the northern one, but one along the ridge known as the South Valley Hill that was also the route of the Philadelphia and Lancaster Turnpike in eastern Chester County. It is tradition that this selection was the result of the persuasive abilities of Joshua Evans Jr., the landlord of the Paoli Inn. "It is said, "Julius Sasche observed in his account of the old inn written in 1887,"that the first survey of the road was located from Columbia to the 'Warren' without much difficulty, but from that point east great difficulties presented themselves in finding a passable route for leaving the Chester Valley. The route as run by Mr. Haines [in an earlier survey for a canal] went through the valley from the Warren, north of the valley ridge, by way of Howelltown, recrossing to the south of the ridge a short distance north of the Spread Eagle Tavern; this route would have completely cut the Paoli off from the new contemplated highway. The road was finally located on the south side of the Valley ridge, so as to pass north of the Paoli Tavern. It is said that this conclusion was due to the influence and demands of General Evans, backed by several, good dinners, who, in the meantime, had been elected to the National Congress, wherein he represented the district from 1829 to 1833." A similar account was given by a writer, identified simply as "M.A.", in the Norristown Herald in late 1877. "When he [Major Wilson] had got on in the survey below Downingtown," he wrote, "it was said, and currently believed in Chester County, that Gen. Joshua Evans, who was then a Democratic Representative in Congress, elected by the great Jackson wave in 1828, and who owned and lived at the Paoli tavern, feasted and feted Major Wilson, the survey corps, and the canal board, until the track was diverted from its natural bed, the great valley, and drawn up the ridge by tortuous windings till the Paoli and several other taverns on the Lancaster Turnpike were reached. Having with great trouble and expense gotten up to the high ground," M.A. added, "the terminus had to be eased down to Philadelphia by an inclined plane, involving the use of stationary engines." With one exception, near Gap, the maximum grade along the route surveyed by Major Wilson and his corps was fixed at 30 feet per mile. The maximum radius of curvature was set at 631 feet. Construction work on the road was started early in April of 1829. On December 30, 1828 the Canal Commissioners had advertised in the American Republican (and, presumably, in other newspapers) that "proposals will be received at the Office of the Pennsylvania Rail-way, in the city of Lancaster, until four o'clock on the 27th of January next, for the grading and road formation of a portion of said Rail-way, beginning at the Borough of Columbia and extending eastward twenty miles, and also for the grading and formation of another portion of said Rail-way, beginning at a point near the residence of the late Judge Peters, on the Schuylkill River, and extending westward a distance of twenty miles. Proposals will also be received at the same time for the necessary Bridges and Culverts in the portions described." It was also announced that "the line will be distinctly marked and divided into sections of convenient size". Soon afterwards there were similar advertisements soliciting proposals for tons of broken stone; wrought iron nails ("three inches in length and three-eighths of an inch in diameter"); granite blocks ("three and a half feet in length, twelve inches wide and twelve inches deep"); malleable iron rails ("in lengths of about fifteen feet, two and a half inches in width and five-eighths of an inch in thickness, prepared for laying"); castings for "chairs" on which the rails were to be seated; fencing; and other materials needed to construct the track. The superintendent for the portion of the railway known as the "Paoli section", extending fourteen miles west from the "White Hall" (in what is now Rosemont), was Enoch Davis. It was the duty of the superintendent to see that all the work was "executed strictly according to the specifications" and "to report all defective work immediately". Among his instructions it was specified, "It is expected that every part of the work will be executed in a faithful and workmanship manner; no indifferent or careless work will be estimated or received". The manner in which the track was to be laid was also described in detail in the printed specifications. For the Paoli section, trenches for the sills or sleepers were to be dug "four feet apart from center to center, one foot in width, sixteen inches in depth and eight feet in length", with the earth that was removed "deposited on the slope of the nearest embankment". The trenches were then to be filled with broken stone "no particle of which must be larger than a cube of two inches", with "no earth, no clay, or material ... suffered to be mixed with the broken stone". The stone was also to be "well compacted with a heavy hammer" as each layer of four inches was put in, to form a bed for the sills. The sills were to be "of chestnut oak or white oak, free from sap and sound in every respect, seven and a half feet in length, and of sufficient size to square seven inches", with notches on the upper side "for the horse path and for the reception of the string pieces", and were to be "laid and firmly adjusted to the proper level with a wooden rammer". Finally, the string pieces, of yellow pine six inches square, were then to "be placed on the notches, and keyed up". Onto them were spiked flat iron bars, on which the cars were to ride. (Actually, in the construction of the rail road four different styles of track were used, according to a history of the rail road written in 1839 by a W. H. Wilson. In some sections the sills were granite blocks rather than wood, with holes five-eighths of an inch in diameter drilled into them, into which were placed locust plugs, to which the stringers were spiked. In others, "edge rails" of rolled iron, 15 feet long, 3-1/2 inches deep, parallel on the top and bottom, and weighing 41-1/2 pounds per lineal foot, were seated on a "chair" fastened to locust sills or to granite blocks. (Some of these granite blocks, actually used when the rail road was first built, can be seen today as part of the reviewing stand at the Paoli Memorial Grounds in Malvern. There are also some of them just west of Sugartown Road in East Whiteland Township, in a square that contains the graves of some of the workmen who died during the construction work when a cholera epidemic hit their rail road camp in November of 1832.) The project, however, soon ran into financial difficulties. There was also continued criticism of the route selected for the rail road, especially as it approached Philadelphia, and of the workmanship in its construction, as well as complaints about the amount of compensation for damages being offered by the Canal Commissioners to affected landholders. The results were delays in the construction work and even threats to its completion. On the other hand, throughout 1830 a number of public meetings were held at which proponents of the project expressed their concern over these delays and at which resolutions were adopted urging that the work be expedited. As early as in January of 1830, for example, at a public meeting held at the home of Jacob Parke in Downingtown, it was resolved that "the interests of the State requires the completion, with all practicable expedition, of the Pennsylvania Railroad so far as it has already been located ... to open to the several counties of Lancaster, Chester and Delaware, a ready way to market, and an easy communication with the iron and coal regions of the interior of the State". The early completion of the Columbia and Philadelphia Rail Road was considered by many "an object of the highest importance to the people of Chester County". To expedite the work, in March 1831 the Legislature passed an Act "To continue the improvement of the state by canals and railroads", approved by the Governor, George Wolf, on March 28. In the first section of the Act it was enacted that "it shall be and hereby is made the duty of the canal commissioners to complete as soon as practicable, the whole of the railroad between the rivers Schuylkill and Susquehanna ... beginning at the intersection of Vine and Broad streets, in the city of Philadelphia, and thence extending to the end of the canal basin at Columbia, in the county of Lancaster, a distance of eighty-one miles and three-fourths of a mile", with "the sum of six hundred thousand dollars ... hereby specifically appropriated" to the project during the present year. It was further provided that "the said commissioners shall complete the first twenty miles of the said railroad proceeding from Philadelphia westwardly, and cause the said part of the rail road to be finished, with double track, engines and all other means to make it useful for transportation, with the least possible delay". There continued to be complaints, however. Among the criticisms, stated in the form of resolutions at a public meeting at the Warren tavern in January of the following year, were the employment of youths as engineers, rather than "a few active and experienced men, good judges of the construction of bridges, culverts, &c"; that "there have been made unnecessarily too many curves on said Rail Road"; that "the wooden bridges on the Rail Road, will entirely fail in answering the purposes intended"; and that "the imbecility of the report of the canal commissioners, the tardiness with which the public improvements have been carried on, the inefficiency of those who ought to be the most experienced and efficient call finally upon the legislature to effect a healthy reorganization" of the canal board! In December 1832 the Canal Commissioners reported, "A single track, with sidings, has been finished (except the viaduct over the river Schuylkill) from Philadelphia to the intersection with the West Chester rail road [now Malvern]. It was first used on the 20th of September, and on the 18th of October the road was so far completed as to be partially opened for public use, from which time to the first of November instant [less than two weeks!], 1322 passengers have been carried along it in stages. The second track of 22 miles, is in rapid progress, and may be completed by the first of January next. The south track for the whole distance of 22 miles will be formed with edge rails on stone blocks, and the north track will be partly stone and partly wooden rails, both plated with flat bars of iron." The trains were drawn by two horses, and the cars were similar to Tally-ho four-in-hand coaches, with passengers riding on both the inside and the outside. It was not until October of 1834, however, that the full length of double track road was completed between Philadelphia and Columbia. (In their report in December 1833 the Canal Commissioners had admitted that "owing to a want of appropriations, and various causes over which the Canal Commissioners had no control, the completion of it has been unreasonably delayed". They also reported delays in obtaining the iron rails, chairs, bolts and wedges that had been ordered in England, as before the "contracts [for them] could be made in England, the manufacturers of iron in that country had received very large orders, which rendered it impossible to get more iron prepared and shipped during the present season".) "The completion of this magnificent work of internal improvement," it was proclaimed in the October 16, 1834 issue of the American Republican," was celebrated with proper ceremony on the 7th inst. - - Gov. Wolf, the heads of departments, and the canal commissioners were present upon the occasion, and passed along the line from Columbia to Philadelphia. ... The engines, with their respective trains, moved off in fine style, amid the reiterated cheers of the assembled throng, on the route to Philadelphia. The day was fine, and the company kept in a constant state of excitement, by the incessant cheering from the group of inhabitants assembled along the line of the road." The rail road covered 81.75 miles. According to Wilson's 1839 history, a little less than 57 miles were described as straight track; the rest was curved, with the radii of the curves ranging from 631 feet to 3782 feet. There were 75 culverts, with spans of from four feet to 25 feet, and 22 bridges or viaducts, while the rail road itself was crossed by 33 bridges to accommodate public or private roads. The total cost of its construction was $3,756,577.20. Of this amount, $2,181,156.25 was spent for the railway's superstructure; $649,158.69 for grading; $135,934.31 for engineering and superintendence; $44-3,864..74 for culverts and bridges;$111,787.12 for buildings and machinery; $54,431.94 for repairs and incidentals, $65,410.86 for fencing; $54,833.29 for damages; and $60,000 for "alterations to accommodate the city of Lancaster". The motive power for the rail road was furnished by the state, but the cars, both for passengers and for freight, were privately owned, with the owner having the privilege of hooking his car or cars onto a train by paying the required tolls. Several companies were soon formed to operate cars for the passenger traffic, among them Miller & Co., Peters, Calder & Co., and, later, Bingham & Dock. There was also a firm known as "The Blue Line", because its cars were painted blue, and which advertised that its cars were the safest because they were run "at the rear end of the train, where there is less danger from collisions"! There was considerable competition among these companies for the available passenger traffic. As the train pulled into a station, the agent or conductor for each line would jump off his car and try to persuade passengers to use his company, in what has been described as "circus barker fashion". There was even pushing and shoving of the passengers by the agent to get them to board his car; occasionally a curious onlooker might suddenly find himself a passenger on the train! One practice was for the conductor immediately to grab the luggage or baggage of a passenger and put it onto his car - having secured the luggage, the passenger naturally followed it. It has been reported that the competition sometimes even led to fist fights between conductors. For produce going into the markets in Philadelphia, the car owner would frequently purchase the produce from the local farmers and load it on a market car in advance, ready to be hooked onto the train as it passed by. Tolls were collected both for the use of the road and for the use of the motive power provided by the state. For carrying freight along the road there were actually thirteen different toll rates, ranging from four mills to four cents per ton per mile and averaging about two cents per ton/mile. The lowest rates were for coal, stone, iron ore, and timber, and for vegetables, lime, and manure; the highest rates were for dry goods, drugs, medicine, and for steel and furs. The U.S. mail was carried for one mill per mile for each ten pounds. The rate for passengers was one cent per mile. A use toll was also levied for each car passing over the road. The tolls for the motive power were set at one cent per mile for each car with four wheels, and five mills per mile for each additional pair of wheels. There was also a motive power toll of one cent per mile for each passenger and of 1.5 mills per mile "for other kinds of loading". The purpose of these motive power tolls was specifically to establish a fund for the maintenance of the motive power and its repair. Paoli was designated as one of the places at which these tolls were to be collected, with John Parr the state agent. In 1836 he collected a total of $5,705.75, $4,569.56 for the use of the rail road and $1,136.19 for the use of the motive power. A decade later, the total collected at Paoli was $13,571.16, while by 1852 the total exceeded $23,400. Wages for the superintendent of motive power, according to Wilson, were four dollars a day, while clerks and car inspectors were paid half that amount. Master mechanics also received $4 a day, and the foreman in the workshop $2. The pay for a locomotive engineer was $2 a day, with that of a fireman $1.25, and that of watermen and woodmen one dollar a day. The actual expense for one trip between the two places was reported to be $14.60, based on a trip of eight hours length, including "stoppages". This included four dollars for 20 bushels of coke, at $.20 a bushel; six dollars for one and a half cords of wood, at $4.00 a cord; sixty cents for oil; and four dollars for the engineer and attendants. Originally, it was anticipated that horses would be the primary motive power for the trains, with, as previously noted, a horse track running between the two rails. By February 1834, however, the use of two-horse teams on the completed parts of the road was prohibited as "injurious to the rail road", and in April the Canal Commissioners were authorized "to place locomotive engines on the railway" by the Legislature. In early July it was noted in the American Republican that it had "hitherto been a matter of doubt with many of the citizens, whether the Pennsylvania Rail Road, between Philadelphia and Columbia, could admit of the use of locomotives, in consequence of the numerous and abrupt curves which have occurred in the construction of the road", but that "the unfavorable anticipation we, in common with very many of our fellow citizens, had indulged in, were without foundation, and that recent experiment made with a new locomotive engine, have afforded conclusive and satisfactory evidences, that the Rail Road is well adapted to the application of steam power, and that there is no reason whatever to apprehend any difficulty or inconvenience, from any of the curves upon the whole route". In their annual report in December 1834. the Canal Commissioners observed that after receiving authorization to place locomotives on the road "directions were given to the superintendent to procure if possible fifteen, for the use of the Columbia Railway. Two have already been purchased and placed on the road," the Commissioners noted, "they perform well. The remaining thirteen have been engaged, ten of which will be placed upon the road by the first of March next, and the other three by the first day of June", As already noted, these two locomotives, the "Lancaster" and the "Columbia", were used to pull the two inaugural trains at the formal opening of the rail road in October. The "Lancaster" had been put into service on the previous June 28th, and was the first locomotive used on the railroad. It was built by Matthias W. Baldwin, of Philadelphia, and weighed about 17,000 pounds. Its one set of driving wheels were 54" in diameter, and it was capable of hauling gross loads of 75 tons. The Canal Board also predicted, in its report, that from "the present prospects of a large increase of business on the Pennsylvania improvements .... it will require from twenty to twenty five engines to accommodate the trade and travelling next season, and that this number must be increased annually for several years to come". The use of locomotives on the road was not without opposition, however. In December 1834, at "a large and representative meeting of citizens, convened at the public house of Mrs. Anne Dillon, in Downingtown", resolutions were adopted that "the enormous expense occurred by the use of locomotives upon the railway ... call loudly into the people's pockets for taxes"; that "the locomotives (as now used on the railway) put our lives and property in danger from fire; buildings having been burnt and our woods and grain fields being put on fire by sparks from the engines"; and that "a committee ... draft a memorial to the legislature expressing the sense of the meeting". For the first decade, both horses and locomotives were used as motive power, despite the differences in speed that resulted. To enable the faster trains to pass the slower ones, some fifty turn-outs or sidings, parallel to the main tracks and about 160 feet long, were constructed along the route, about a mile and a half apart. (In at least one case, however, the dual motive power was the cause of an accident: in May 1835 it was reported in the American Republican that as a locomotive with a train of cars was met by a "burthen" car with two horses attached "the horses became fractious from the noise of the engine" and "sprang into the same track, and directly before it". They were both knocked down, it was further reported, and one of them was killed.) By October 1835 there were seventeen locomotives on the Philadelphia and Columbia Rail Road. Ten of them (the "Schuylkill", the "Susquehanna", the "Delaware", the "Pennsylvania", the "Philadelphia", the "Lancaster", the "Columbia", the "Juniata", the "Brandywine", and the "Kentucky") had been built by Baldwin; one (the "America") by Coleman Sellers & Son; and one (the "William Penn") by Long & Norris, all of Philadelphia, with the other five (the "John Bull", the "Atlantic", the "Albion", the "Red Rover", and the "Fire Fly") made in England by Stephenson & Co. or Charles Tayleur & Co. The English engines, it was explained by Edward F. Gay, who had succeeded Major Wilson as the road's chief engineer following the latter's death in 1835, had been bought "simply because locomotives could not be manufactures here, fast enough to meet the wants of the road", with the further observation that his "opinion has always been in favor of encouraging the mechanics of our country in the manufacture of engines"* According to a report the following January by a committee appointed by the House of Representatives to examine the state of the motive power, however, "the average number actually running daily, was but three or four!", with the result that "loaded cars have frequently stood waiting for conveyance by motive power". (One of its recommendations to prevent these breakdowns, incidentally, was "that the speed of engines drawing passenger cars should be so regulated as not to exceed 15 miles per hour, and that those with burden cars should be limited to 10".) Nevertheless, by the end of 1836 the Canal Commissioners reported, "The application of the use of mechanical or animal, as motive power, is a question that experience has so firmly settled in favor of the superiority of the former, that the board, agreeably to the provisions of the resolution passed June 16th, 1836, authorized the proper officer on the road to contract for twenty [more] locomotive engines, adapted to the use of mineral coal, in addition to the eleven authorized to be purchased by the act of the 28th day of June, 1836". In their report the following year the Commissioners also noted, "One engine on the Philadelphia and Columbia rail road, during the past season, made 17 successive trips of 77 miles each, with the regularity of the return of day." (The locomotive that made this record, incidentally, was the "Paoli"!) To reduce the costs of repairs and the "wear and tear" on the locomotives, their speed was, as suggested, "restricted, during the season [of 1837], to fifteen miles up grade and twelve down for passengers, and to twelve up and ten down for burden trains". (This restriction was reflected in what was perhaps the rail road's first timetable, issued on April 1st of that year.) While it was noted that "some discontent has existed at the low rate of speed on the road", it was also reported that as a result the "safety of travellers is increased four fold". The use of sandboxes in front of the driving wheels, to provide better traction on the rails, was also introduced in that year. Describing a trip on the Philadelphia and Columbia in 1836, a resident of West Chester wrote in her diary, "We were whirled along at a rapid rate that seemed like flying. The steam engine puffed out great columns of black smoke, also sparks of fire that burned our clothing and annoyed us very much. There were a number of cars attached to the steam engine, an admirable invention of man and a great display of his wisdom. It is a wonderful contrivance to facilitate our mode of conveyance with ease and rapidity. ... Objects pass by so swiftly as to occasion confusion of ideas, there was such a whirl." In a similar account, in A Pleasant Peregrination through the Prettiest Part of Pennsylvania, published in 1836, "Peregrine Prolix" observed, "The Columbia Road is made of the best materials, and has cost the state a great sum; but it has its faults. The curves are too numerous, and their radii generally too short, in consequence of which the journey to Columbia (eighty miles) consumes seven or eight hours, instead of four or five. The viaducts are built of wood instead of stone, and the engineer doubting their ability to bear the weight of two trains at once, has brought the two tracks on them so close together, as to prevent two trains passing at the same time. Thus, in shunning Scylla, has he rushed into the jaws of Charybdis, for in several instances accidents have occurred from the collision of cars upon these insufficient viaducts. The roofs are so low as to prevent the locomotives from having chimneys of a sufficient height to prevent the sparks from setting fire to the cars and baggage. The chimneys of the steam-tugs are jointed, and in passing a viaduct the upper part is turned down, which allows the smoke to rush out at so small a height, as to envelope the whole train in a dense and noisome cloud of smoke and cinders. Notwithstanding these inconveniences," he continued, "a fine day and beautiful country made our day's ride very pleasant; as we soon found that the smoky or deals could be passed without damage, by shutting our mouths and eyes, and holding our noses and tongues." The early locomotives used coke and wood for fuel, and as late as in November 1845 the superintendent of the railway advertised for proposals to supply "5000 cords of good OAK WOOD for the use of the Locomotive Engine for the ensuing year". But in 1836, as noted earlier, the purchase of locomotives adapted to the use of mineral bituminous coal as fuel was authorized. Two years later the Commissioners further reported, "The experiments which the board directed to be made, have established the fact that anthracite coal can be successfully used as fuel in propelling, at any required speed, the locomotive engines, while its use will aid in the security of the passengers and the safety of the property of persons bordering upon the road". In 1843 the supply of fuel on hand included 3470 3/4 cords of wood, 120 tons of anthracite coal, and 705 tons of bituminous coal. The passenger cars on the rail road were described in 1838 by David Stevenson, a locomotive builder from London, in his Civil Engineering in North America. "The passenger carriages on the Columbia Road," he wrote," are extremely large and commodious. They are seated for sixty passengers and are made so high in the roof that the tallest person may stand upright in them without inconvenience. There is a passage between the seats. In winter they are heated by stoves, "It is not denied," A. Mehaffy, the superintendent of motive power, observed in the Canal Commissioners' report in December 1837, "that accidents have occurred ... and some of them of a distressing kind, but it is fearlessly asserted that all have been produced by the negligence or temerity of the unfortunate objects. In most instances life has been lost, or endangered, by the culpable and unnecessary tarrying of persons in taverns, after the repeated ringing of the bell for the departure of the train, and by the consequent ineffectual attempt to enter the cars when in motion. ... In others, the rash attempts to jump off while the train is in rapid progress, or obstinate disregard of danger manifested by persons in obstinately remaining on the track of an approaching engine, has, and while such practices are persisted in, will, cause their own destruction. ... In fact it is not recollected that a single passenger was hurt who remained in his seat while the train was in motion, and had re-occupied it before starting again. It would add much to the credit of the road as well as to their own safety, if the practice of hastening into the taverns before the trains become stationary, and of tarrying 'there after they are in motion again, were discontinued by passengers." Not all the accidents could be attributed to this practice, however. In August 1836, for example, it was reported that when ons of the passenger trains passed a turn-out "a few miles below the Paoli" a switch "became displaced by the jarring of the engine and front cars, [and] the hinder part of the train was conveyed off the main track without becoming detached - dragging some of the cars rather roughly between the two tracks for a considerable distance. All the passengers, among whom were some ladies and an infant," it was reported, "were thrown from their seats, causing great confusion without the least injury being received, except by one person, who having less prudence than necessary, leaped through the door, before the speed of the cars had been checked, and as might be expected, met with a rather awkward reception on coming to the ground." Another early accident, in the same summer, was caused when "some ill-disposed person placed a plank across the track, near the 15 mile-board", throwing the engine and train off the track, through a board fence, and into a cornfield. There the engine "capsized topsy-turvy, live-trapping the engineer under it". He was rescued "by removing the earth, which took the greater part of thirty minutes", and fortunately was uninjured other than being slightly scalded. While the "numerous and abrupt curves which have occurred in the construction of the road" gave "no reason whatever to apprehend any difficulty or inconvenience" to the use of steam locomotives, their use did require some extensive improvement of the track. Where the original track had been constructed of wooden stringers plated with a flat iron bar, such as in parts of the Paoli section, it was necessary to replace it with iron rails, to support the weight of the locomotives. In the report of the Canal Commissioners in December 1836 they noted that the eastern 22 miles of the northern track, particularly, required work and could not be considered "permanent" at that time, while in the following year they reported that that section "has become extremely rough and undulating, and the wooden rail used in the remainder is very much decayed". "This is a frightful source of injury to cars and engines," it was further reported, "and ought, in the opinion of the boaxd, to be remedied by relaying the whole length with iron edge rail". The cost of laying each mile of new track was estimated at $13,660.48 a mile: $400 for 105 tons of T-rail; $14.08 for 1760 locust cross-ties; $480.48 for34,380 feet of plank; $280 for 3-/4 tons of cast chairs; $400 for 8000 brad head spikes; $132 for 1100 screw bolts; $640 for 640 perches of broken stone; $1600 for mechanical work; and $320 for taking up the old track. Because of a lack of appropriations, however, and the fact that the rails were "not available in this country at a reasonable rate" and had to be ordered from England, it was not until 1841 that the Commissioners were able to report that the "relaying of the north track, from its intersection with the West Chester railroad to White Hall, has been completed". Steps were also taken to eliminate the Belmont Plane, at the eastern end of the rail road, beginning in 1835, with the incorporation of the West Philadelphia Railroad Company. Its plan was to construct a railroad from the Philadelphia and Columbia at what is now Ardmore to a point just south of Market Street on the Schuylkill River. When it ran into financial difficulties, the work was taken over by the Canal Commissioners, and completed in October 1850. It was also found that wood cross-ties were preferable to the original stone sleepers used in some sections of the road. "The travel upon this railway was much impeded in the early part of February last," the Commissioners observed in their report for 1840, "by the sudden breaking up of the frost. A considerable portion of the road was originally laid upon blocks, without a sufficient number of cross ties to preserve the adjustment necessary for large trains propelled by heavy locomotive 'engines. The consequence has been, that whenever the frost left the ground, the soil became saturated, afforded no support to the blocks - and the rails would necessarily spread, and the engines and their trains thereby precipitated from the track, to the serious injury of the transporter, a loss of revenue to the Commonwealth, and a most annoying interruption to the regular business of the road. To remedy the defect, an additional number of cross-ties have been inserted." While the overall receipts of the rail road exceeded its operating expenses each year, from 1835 to 1837 the tolls from the use of the motive power were not sufficient to cover the expenses of its maintenance and repair, with a deficit of more than $45,000 in each of those years. It was not until 1843, however, that the revenue of the road was, as J. B. Moorhead, the new superintendent of motive power, reported it, equal to the cost of repairs and management, and the interest on the cost of construction", accomplished despite some reductions in toll rates that year. "(W)e cannot refrain," the American Republican observed, "from giving Mr. Moorhead ... the credit which every unprejudiced citizen will cheerfully accord him, of having improved the Phila. & Col. Rail Road, from being an annual drain of thousands and tens of thousands from the State Treasury, to defray the expenses of its management and repairs, into a source of annual revenue to the state over and above all expenses." After a decade of operation, in 1844 the revenues exceeded operating costs by more than $238,000, leaving a surplus of $27,921.31 after interest costs. The average number of passengers that were transported over the whole railway in that year was 50,940, with the total freight hauled some 100,000 tons. There were 41 locomotive engines operating on the road, and on April 1st the use of horses as motive power had been completely banned. (After another ten years, the volume of freight carried had increased fourfold over that of 1844, and the surplus was more than $200,000. To "meet the progressive inclination for fast running speed", in that year passenger trains were scheduled to run at 24-/2 miles an hour and express trains at 36 miles an hour, including stoppages. There were also eight new locomotives, purchased the year before, running on the line.) But while the Philadelphia and Columbia Rail Road showed a profit, even including the interest on construction costs, the Main Line of Public Works as a whole did not. Nearly $18 million had been spent in its construction, and in 1842 Governor David Porter estimated that the total consolidated debt of the system was more than $30 million. Travel over it, at best, was cumbersome and slow, with delays at each transfer between canal and rail road. In the winter and the spring, when the canals were frequently frozen over or damaged by floods, the system was shut down from December to March, As early as in 1838 studies of the practicality of a transportation system between Philadelphia and Pittsburg, entirely by railroad, had been started; on August 1st the following year the Canal Commissioners had appointed Charles W. Schlatter to make surveys of various routes for such a system. In June of 1842 he submitted a detailed report of his investigation of three possible routes - their distance, the highest summit on the route, the maximum grades required, the estimated costs for construction and operations for each route, and the motive power required to handle an assumed volume of traffic. The estimated costs for the three routes ranged from $9,496,709 to $11,107,431. While the report was received with interest, in the light ol the already existing debt, coupled with the overall depressed state of the economy in the state following the Panic of 1837, the Legislature was reluctant to incur new liabilities of this magnitude at this time, and no action was taken. In December 1845, however, "a large and distinguished gathering" met at the Chinese Museum in Philadelphia and adopted a number of resolutions relating to the importance, and practicality, of a rail road across the state, and requesting that the Legislature incorporate a private company to construct and operate such a railroad. Three months later an Act "to incorporate the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, and authorizing it "to lay down, erect, construct and establish a railroad ... beginning at, and uniting with the western terminus of the Harrisburg, Portsmouth, Mount Joy and Lancaster Railroad, in the borough of Harrisburg... and terminating at such point or points, in, at, or near the city of Pittsburg, or other place in the county of Allegheny" was passed by the Legislature, and on April 13, 1846 approved by Governor Francis Shunk. (The Act also specified, among other provisions, that all tonnage carried on the road "more than twenty miles, between the tenth day of March and the first day of December, in each and every year, shall be subject to a toll or duty, for the use of the commonwealth, at the rate of five mills per mile for each ton of two thousand pounds".) By the following February, after intensive effort, the 60,000 shares of stock necessary for formal organization had finally been subscribed for (30,000 of them by the City of Philadelphia) at $50 for each share. On February 25, 1847 the Letters patent were issued to the new company, and it was officially organized on March 30th. The work on the rail road between Harrisburg and Pittsburg was under the direction and supervision of John Edgar Thomson, the chief engineer. (He earlier, at the age of 19, had worked on the survey of the Philadelphia and Columbia Rail Road, and later was to become president of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company.) While the work was still in its early stages, the new company also began negotiations to extend its service east of Harrisburg and into Philadelphia. In November 1848 it entered into a 20-year lease arrangement (soon extended to 999 years) to operate the Harrisburg, Portsmouth, Mount Joy and Lancaster Railroad, and in March of 1853 it obtained the right to operate its equipment over the tracks of the Philadelphia and Columbia. Thus, upon completion of its road over the mountains in February 1854, the Pennsylvania was able to run its trains all the way across the state, between Philadelphia and Pittsburg. Three trains ran in each direction daily, the trip taking 13 to 17 hours. The competition provided by the new railroad obviously only aggravated the problems of thr state's Main Line of Public Works. To rid itself of its unprofitable burden, within two months, in late April of 1854, the state tried unsuccessfully to sell the whole system for $20 million. But even when the price was lowered to half this amount the following year there still were no bids for it. It was finally purchased in June 1857 by The Pennsylvania Railroad, for $7,500,000, with the further agreement that with the payment of an additional $1,500,000 the Pennsylvania would also thereafter be relieved of its freight tonnage tax. The Philadelphia and Columbia Rail Road Company was no longer a separate entity. But its existence for almost three decades as a part of the state's Main Line of Public Works is still reflected in the use of the name "the Main Line" to describe this area - and its successor, the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, was to play a significant role in the development of it and Tredyffrin and Easttown townships. TopSources Laws of the State of Pennsylvania Newspaper clipping file : Chester County Historical Society Burgess, George and Kennedy, Miles C.: Centennial History of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company" Peregrine Pirolix": A Pleasant Peregrination, etc. |
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Page last updated: 2009-07-29 at 14:31 EST |