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Home : Quarterly Archives : Volume 24 |
Tredyffrin Easttown Historical Society |
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Source: October 1986 Volume 24 Number 4, Pages 143–150 The Night of September 20, 1777 Have you ever read the inscription on the monument at the Paoli Memorial Grounds in what is now the Borough of Malvern? "Sacred to the memory," it reads on the west side, "of the patriots' who on this spot fell sacrifice to British barbarity during the struggle for American independence on the night of the 20th of September 1777" "The atrocious massacre which this stone commemorates," it continues on the north side, "was perpetrated by British troops under the immediate command of Major General Grey" "Here repose," it is reported on the south side, "the remains of fifty-three American soldiers, who were the victims of cold-blooded cruelty in the well-known 'Massacre at Paoli' while under the command of General Anthony Wayne, an officer whose military conduct, bravery and humanity were equally conspicuous throughout the Revolutionary War" The original monument was erected by the Republican Artillerists of Chester County on the fortieth anniversary of the encounter, in 1817. It was only about two and a half years after the end of the War of 1812, and feelings against the British obviously were still running high and strongly felt! The author of the inscription was Dr. William Darlington, one of Chester County's leading citizens of the period -- banker, scientist, a founder of the Chester County Cabinet of Natural Sciences, a trustee of the West Chester Academy, and later a member of the United States Congress for two terms and a leader in the Whig party. It has helped to perpetuate two widely-held misconceptions about the engagement the monument commemorates. The first misconception is that the engagement took place at Paoli. It actually occurred in what was then a part of Willistown Township, some two miles from the Paoli. It was, in fact, much nearer to the Warren Tavern than to the Paoli. The name Paoli may have been used because that inn was so much more closely associated with the patriot cause, the Warren having been considered by many to be a Tory stronghold. But the name is really a misnomer! The second misconception is that it was a massacre. It was not, as the word massacre usually connotes, an assault on unarmed and defenseless citizens. It was, rather, a well-conceived and extraordinarily well-executed military attack on an outpost of the American army, an outpost that put the British army encamped in Tredyffrin in a critical and precarious situation. In the summer of 1777 the British commander in New York, General Sir William Howe, decided to attack Philadelphia, the capital of the American colonies, from the southwest rather than from the north, across New Jersey. On July 23d he loaded more than 15,000 troops, including some 5,000 German Hessian mercenaries, into a huge fleet of ships. Sailing down the Jersey coast, after a month's voyage they came up the Chesapeake Bay and landed on August 25th at Turkey Point, at the Head of the Elk, about fifty miles from Philadelphia. When the fleet was spotted off the Delaware capes in late July, to protect the capital General Washington moved his army of about 11,000 men south from its position in northern New Jersey. On September 9th he took a position on the east bank of the Brandywine at Chad's Ford to intercept the British. Two days later the Battle of the Brandywine took place. With his superior numbers, Howe was able to divide his forces into two columns. One, under General Baron Wilhelm von Knyphausen, advanced towards the center of the American line at Chad's Ford, while the other, a larger group under General Lord Charles Cornwallis, executed a flanking maneuver to the north, around the right flank of the American position. Although the American troops in the center, under General Wayne, were able to turn back the British, the flanking movement was completely successful, and forced the American army to withdraw from the field. Washington reassembled his defeated army at Chester. The next day the army moved out towards Philadelphia and camped at Germantown, before moving westward to be in a position to protect the munitions works at Warwick Furnace and Coventry Forge and the military stores at Valley Forge and Reading. When the British failed to follow up their victory at the Brandywine, Washington was convinced by his generals to make another attempt to intercept them in their advance towards the fords by which they could cross the Schuylkill river to enter Philadelphia -- Matson's Ford (now Conshohocken), Swedes' Ford (now Norristown), Fatland Forge (at Valley Forge), and Long Ford and Gordon's Ford (now Phoenixville). Accordingly, on the night of September 15th Washington moved his army into the Great Valley, and established his headquarters at Malin Hall. As the British approached the area, from the vicinity of the Turk's Head (now West Chester), on the following day, the Americans were deployed in position along the ridge on the north side of King Road, between the Three Tuns Tavern at Goshen Road and the Ship Inn to the west. During the British advance there were a few preliminary skirmishes along the outpost lines, in the vicinity of the Goshen Meeting House. But just as the two armies were about to meet and join battle, a torrential rain began to fall. "It came down so hard," a Hessian officer, Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister of General Knyphausen's Corps, wrote, "that in a few moments we were drenched and sank in mud up to our calves." The muskets became soaked and useless in the downpour, powder was ruined (the Americans lost an estimated 40,000 cartridges as a result of faulty cartouche boxes), and the ground was soon too soft and muddy for any kind of an assault. (As someone once observed, Revolutionary War battles were sometimes like baseball games: you win some, you lose some, and some are rained out!) Aided by the rain and fog and low-lying clouds, and despite the quagmire, the Americans were able to withdraw to the vicinity of the White Horse Tavern, and then to Yellow Springs, proceeding to the area of Warwick Furnace the following day. Actually, the downpour may have been providential for the American army. Its position on the ridge was once again vulnerable to the same flanking maneuver that the British had executed so successfully at the Brandywine, and Washington reportedly had already determined to retire from the field even before the rains came. The weather simply provided additional cover for the withdrawal action. Even though there was no battle, aside from the few scattered skirmishes, the confrontation is known as the "Battle of the Clouds". While the Americans were at Warwick, replenishing their ammunition and supplies, the British came down the Swedesford Road and the Lancaster Road and, on September 18th, encamped along the south slope of the Great Valley in Tredyffrin, between Howell's Tavern (now Howellville) and the Great Valley Baptist Church. Here the British waited for the rain-swollen waters of the Schuylkill to subside sufficiently for them to accomplish the crossings at the fords. (Far from their Wilmington base of supplies, the British troops garnered their supplies by foraging off the land. One local farmer is alleged to have claimed than he had "not even a spoon left to eat my victuals nor a comb to comb my hair"! The claims for damages filed by residents of Tredyffrin and Easttown townships for compensation for the losses from the British depredations totalled more than 9,000.) In the meantime, General Wayne, with two brigades totalling about 1500 troops and four cannon, was ordered by Washington back to a position on the ridge to the rear of the British campsite. His mission was to observe the British in their camp and, after being joined by troops under Brigadier General William Smallwood, to harrass the enemy rear as the British broke camp to cross the river. The detachment, according to the historian Charles Stille, in his history of the Pennsylvania Line in the Continental Army, included in the first brigade the 1st Pennsylvania Regiment, under Col. Chambers; the 2d Pennsylvania Regiment, under Col. Stewart; the 7th Pennsylvania Regiment, under Lt. Col. Connor; and the 10th Pennsylvania Regiment, under Lt. Col. Hubley; and in the second brigade the 4th Pennsylvania Regiment, under Lt. Col. Butler; the 5th Pennsylvania Regiment, under Lt. Col. Johnston; the 8th Pennsylvania Regiment, under Col. Broadhead; and the 11th Pennsylvania Regiment, under Col. Humpton, who was also second in command. The outpost was located within about three miles of the British camp, on the Bowen farm, one of the few cleared areas along the wooded ridge, and about a mile south of the Warren Tavern and two miles southwest of the Paoli. (The camp was about 300 yards to the east of the present Memorial Grounds.) There is some question as to the exact location of Wayne's headquarters. Futhey & Cope wrote that they were in the home of a farmer named Joshua King, but Benjamin Lossing reported that they were simply in a field tent. It has also been suggested that they were in the home of Cromwell Pearce on King Road, one of the few known Whigs in an area dotted with Tories. From this position, General Wayne soon recognized the vulnerable position of the British and the possibility of trapping them in their camp in the valley, with wooded hills on either side. When he urged Washington to attack, however, the Commander-in Chief on September 18th wrote Wayne that his army was "so much fatigued" that it was "impossible" for him to mount the assault General Wayne recommended. (Nevertheless, on the following day Wayne again wrote to him, "There never was, nor never will be a finer opportunity of giving the enemy a fatal blow than the present.") Wayne also reported in a letter to Washington on the morning of September 19th that he believed General Howe "knows nothing of my situation" and that in establishing his outpost he had "taken every precaution to prevent any intelligence getting to him". In fact, this belief was far from the case. Whether through spies, reconnaisance, loose talk in the local taverns, or through Tory sympathizers, the British not only knew of his "situation", but also had exact information on the number of men he had, the roads leading to his campsite, and even the American countersign, "Here we are and there they go"! (As Harry Emerson Wildes observed, realistically there was no way that a detachment of that size, with its fires and activities, could be located that close to the British and not have its presence known.) "Intelligence having been received of the situation of General Wayne and his design of attacking our rear," Major (then Captain) John Andre later wrote, "a plan was concerted for surprising him, and its execution was entrusted to Major General Grey." It was obviously sound military tactics for the British to eliminate this threat to their rear before they attempted the river crossing. Information was leaked out that the British planned to break camp in the early morning hours of the 21st of September -- but not that, prior to moving out, they also planned a surprise midnight bayonet attack on Wayne's position. The attack was made by two regiments of the British 2d Light Infantry -- the 42d (the famed Black Watch) and the 44th -- under General Grey, with two other regiments -- the 40th (the Excellers) and the 55th -- in reserve, under Lt. Col. Musgrave. Grey's troops marched west on Swedesford Road to Valley Store, and then south on Long Ford Road (now Route 29) to the area of the American encampment, while Musgrave's detachment proceeded up the Bear Road to the Lancaster Road to a position in the vicinity of the Black Bear Tavern.
from Futhey & Cope: History of Chester County As Grey's column advanced, guided by Tory scouts who knew the countryside well, every male inhabitant along the route was captured and taken to the Warren Tavern, to insure secrecy and prevent any alarm from being given. Nevertheless, in addition to the firing by some of Wayne's videttes (mounted sentinels), indicating that someone was approaching, between nine and ten o'clock Wayne received a report from a "Mr. Jones, an old gentleman living near where we were camped" that a servant boy had heard some British soldiers say there would be an attack on the outpost that evening. (Dr. Henry Pleasants, Jr. identified this "Mr. Jones" asan "Abrm. Jones"; Franklin I. Burns identified him as "a patriotic Welsh gentleman, Thomas Jones of Easttown"; and Harry Emerson Wildes identified him as "Morgan Jones", the father of David Jones, the chaplain to Wayne's troops.) With this information, Wayne sent out additional videttes and pickets, and ordered his troops to sleep on their muskets, to keep them at hand and dry, and also to keep their cartouche boxes out of the cold rain that was falling. (Why further precautions were not taken has never been fully explained and became a cause of considerable criticism: Dr. Pleasants has suggested that perhaps it was because the night attack was simply "too foolhardy to be anticipated by the accepted principles of warfare" of that time.) About 200 yards east of the Warren was a blacksmith shop. The British captured the blacksmith there, and made him guide them up the hill to the American position. Breaking out of the woods, they "rushed in upon their [the American] encampment, directed by the light of their fires", and, using only bayonets and sabers, attacked the American camp. Wayne was able, after the initial surprise, to regroup his troops for a reasonably orderly withdrawal to the White Horse, but some units turned in the wrong direction and, silhouetted by the fires, made a ready target for the British bayonet attack. The result was, as one unidentified British officer reported, "a dreadful scene of havoc". "The camp was immediately set on fire," one British officer, Lt. John Hunter, later observed, "and this, with the cries of the wounded, formed altogether one of the most dreadful scenes I ever beheld." Major Andre noted, "The light infantry ... put to bayonet all they came up with ...and stabbed great numbers." A Hessian sergeant is said to have boasted, "I stuck them myself like so many pigs, one after another, until the blood ran out of the touch-hole of my musket." Estimates, mostly from British sources, of the American casualties range from about 150 to as many as 500. Major Andre reported, "Near 200 must have been killed and a great number wounded. 71 prisoners were brought off. 40 badly wounded and left at different houses along the road." General Howe, in his report to Lord Germain, stated his troops "killed and wounded not less than three hundred on the spot, taking between 70 and 80 prisoners." And Lt. Hunter, in his account, wrote, "Four hundred and sixty of the enemy were counted dead the next morning." But on the other hand, the American historian Douglas Freeman, after extensive study of contemporary reports of American senior officers, has estimated the number of Americans killed and wounded at only about 150. In any event, it was a complete and stunning victory for the British, who fully achieved their objective of eliminating the threat of harrassment of their rear. His mission accomplished, General Grey quickly regathered his troops and led them down the Lancaster Road past the Paoli, meeting Col. Musgrave's forces and then proceeding down the Bear Road to the British camp to join the rest of the army in the river crossing operation. That it was not truly a massacre, however, is perhaps reflected by the number of prisoners taken and by an exchange of correspondence between General Howe and General Washington the following day. On September 21st, General Howe wrote to General Washington, "Sir, there having been some wounded officers and men of your army at Howell's Tavern and the neighboring houses with whom a surgeon's mate is left, with orders to join me on the 23rd, if not sooner relieved by one of your surgeons, I am to request you will lose no time in sending whom you think proper for the purpose, with directions to give receipts for the wounded so delivered up as prisoners of war to be here after exchanged. -- "With due respect, I am, Sir, your most obedient servant. ..." That evening, General Washington wrote in reply, "Sir, your favor of this date was received this evening, and agreeable to your request, I have sent Dr. Wilson to take charge of the wounded officers and men of the army under my command who have fallen into your hands at Howell's Tavern and the neighboring houses. The doctor has directions to give you a receipt for all that are delivered, and they will be considered as your prisoners. "I am, Sir, with due respect, your most obedient servant. ..." Within a few days after the engagement, Col. Richard Humpton, perhaps in an effort to cover up his own conduct during the encounter, filed charges that although Wayne had had warning of the impending attack several hours before it took place, he had failed to make "a Disposition till it was too late". A Board of Inquiry, presided over by General Lord Stirling, heard testimony from several of the officers who were there that night. After the hearing, its finding was that the charges were "not proven". Not satisfied with this somewhat inconclusive verdict, General Wayne requested that a general court martial try the case. The Court Martial, with General John Sullivan presiding, convened on October 25th, and continued for five days. In its opinion, announced on November 1st, Wayne was formally acquitted of all charges, with the finding that on the occasion he "did everything that could be expected from an active, brave, and vigilant officer". What was the significance of this so-called "Massacre at Paoli"? From a tactical, military standpoint, it of course enabled the British to cross the Schuylkill River unmolested. The river crossing at the fords was conducted as planned in the early morning of September 21st. With the American army continuing to occupy its position to protect its sources of ammunition and supplies to the west, on September 26th the British were able to enter Philadelphia without opposition, and occupy the city during the winter of 1777-1778. The capture of the capital of the colonies, however, did not bring about the collapse of the American cause that the British had hoped for. From a morale standpoint, in fact, the engagement appears to have strengthened, rather than weakened, the will and resolve of the Pennsylvania troops. After the Battle of Germantown on October 4th, General Wayne wrote to his wife, "Our people, remembering the action of the night of the 20th of September, near the Warren, pushed on with their bayonets and took complete vengeance for that night's work. Our officers exerted themselves to save many of the poor wretches who were crying for mercy, but to little purpose, the rage and fury of the soldiers were not to be restrained for some time at least, not until great numbers of the enemy fell to their bayonets." "Remember Paoli!" was also the battle cry when, in July 1779, troops under General Wayne themselves executed a successful surprise night bayonet attack to capture Stony Point. To their credit, however, the conduct of the Americans on this occasion was conspicuous for its humanity, recognized and acknowledged by the British too. "The Humanity of our brave Soldiery," Wayne wrote to Washington in announcing his victory, "who scorned to take the lives of vanquished foes calling for mercy reflects the highest honor on them & accounts for so few of the Enemy being killed on the occasion."
"Rest well, Paoli's heroes brave, Sources East Whiteland Township Historical Commission: The Battle of the Clouds Donald Grey Brownlow: A Documentary History of the Paoli "Massacre" 1952 (repriented 1977) Henry Pleasants, Jr.: The Battle of Paoli (in the Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, January 1948) Franklin L. Burns: The Midnight Surprise at Paoli (in The Picket Post, January 1945) J. Smith Futhey: Historical Address (on the Occasion of the 100th Anniversary of the Paoli Massacre 1877) J. Smith Futhey & Gilbert Cope: History of Chester County 1881 |
